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THEISM, THE POSTMODERNIST BURIAL OF
METAPHYSICS, AND INDIAN MIND-BODY DUALISM
Vladimir K. Shokhin

There is a post-modernist myth that metaphysics has always been an exclusively Western heritage. This article refutes such a view by reviewing the
many centuries of debate between Indian mind-body dualists and champions
of reductionist physicalism. It also suggests the relevance of the Indian dualistic arguments for contemporary discussions of the mind-body issue.

I
Mind-body dualism has long been integral, not only to the philosophy
of mind, but also to the philosophical foundations of theism. Indeed, the
direct opposition between dualism and two rival ontologies of mind is
of very old age. One of these rivals is physicalism, or naturalistic reductionism, or the identity theory of mind, all of which allow the status of
substance only to the body with its functions. The other is the denial of
substantiality of both material and spiritual kinds, that is, the reduction of
the self to discrete dynamic elements of consciousness and their objects.
If either of these standpoints is admitted, theism loses a secure foundation. Is it not the case that if the soul be an epiphenomenon of corporeal
constituents destined to be annihilated with their destruction, or nothing
more than a flux of sensations, volitions, cogitations, and so on, coordinated by nothing, it can be neither a recipient of eternal bliss nor anything
like the image of God destined to acquire his likeness? And, consequently,
that all practical claims of theism (the acquisition of theōsis being the most
important among them) turn out to be senseless? One may object that
some philosophers have embraced one or other of these positions without
renouncing theism,1 but that says less about the compatibility of theism
with the above-mentioned doctrines than the lack of consistency in these
philosophers’ minds.
It is, in contrast, quite consistent that popularizers of postmodernism who reject theism also consider mind-body dualism outdated.2 This
1
Among the philosophers of Enlightenment one can name Joseph Priestly and some
deists, like John Toland and John Collins and some others. The contemporary approval of
physicalism from the side of theists might be exemplified by P. van Inwagen, Metaphysics
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 4–5, 178–183.
2
So, according to Mark Taylor, while humanistic (modern) atheism transfers the attributes
of God to human nature, more progressive posthumanistic (postmodern) atheology carries
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attitude must be seen within the broader context of their philosophy. Theism is rejected because it is based on classical metaphysics. The latter is in
turn rejected because “the pillars” of contemporary philosophy rejected it:
in the beginning Nietzsche, who demonstrated the death of “a metaphysical God,” then Heidegger, who endorsed such a verdict because metaphysics had supposedly led to the oblivion of Being, the power of technics
and nihilism, and then Derrida and Lyotard who declared it to be the
philosophical expression of “onto-theo-teleo-phallo-phono-logocentrism”
(which is to be treated by the method of “deconstruction”) and, correspondingly, of the totalitarian claim to a universal truth (which, with a
universal rationality, became a justification for some modes of social organization, i.e., power). Finally, theism and metaphysics are also rejected because they are declared to be fruits of an outdated monotheism and Eurocentrism unable to withstand the challenge of non-European thought that
has offered a successful alternative to outdated European rationalism.3
The postmodernist negation of a universal rationality proves, however,
as does any consistent nihilism (I use this term not in its Heideggerean but
in the general sense), to be self-refuting. Surely, if any claim to a universal
truth contains already totalitarianism, then the statement of the non-existence of such truth cannot be an exception to this rule and must express
(let us use Nietzschean idioms) someone’s will to power. And if it is a
universal rationality whose “deconstruction” gives us understanding of
what took place in Auschwitz (as alleged by Lyotard), then also the very
attempt to dismantle metaphysics, being carried out by means of the same
rationality, cannot be relieved from the same responsibility.
But another claim, that metaphysical “logocentrism” remains the legacy of the outdated Hellenic-Mediaeval European tradition alone,4 needs
not a logical but historical refutation. To examine the most abundant nonEuropean philosophical tradition would be most useful in this regard. I
mean Indian philosophy, which prior to the modern age had not been
in the least influenced by the West and may be considered, therefore,
purely autochthonous.
the death of God to completion by denying the idea of autonomous selfhood as well and
doesn’t fail to notice that “the death of God is at the same time the death of the self.” M. Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern A/theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 20.
3
On “the great principle of polytheism” as an alternative to monotheism and a pattern of
radical pluralism see, e.g., the paper, “Lob der Polytheismus über Monomythie und Polymythie” in O. Marquard, Abschied vom Prinzipiellen: Philosophische Studien (Stuttgart: P. reclam. jun., 1981), pp. 91–116; and J.-F. Lyotard and J.-L. Thébaud, Au juste: conversations (Paris:
Bourgois, 1979), pp. 33, 35. One of the most typical attacks on metaphysics as the legacy of
Eurocentric worldview one can find in G. Vattimo, After Christianity (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2002).
4
Here the representatives of process-theology are close to postmodernist theologizing,
because they reject not only creationism in the real sense, but also such fundamental Divine
attributes as simplicity, impassibility, immutability, necessity and eternity in favor of their
“dipolar theism.” One of them, Nicholas Wolterstorff, who prefers God to be more everlasting than eternal, also treats metaphysics, which is basic for the abovementioned attributes,
as a specific Hellenic heritage, outdated in the context of the today’s understanding of the
Bible.
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II
The powerful trend of Indian philosophy which has elaborated a very
many-sided mind-body dualism is designated usually by the Sanskrit
compound term ātmavāda (cf. the Palian attavāda). It means “the teaching
of Ātman” or “the teaching that Ātman exists,” Ātman being understood
as the permanent essence, beginningless and endless, correlated with the
psychophysical aggregate of a living being but ontologically foreign to
both its outward and inward body, the locuses of its sensual, active, and
mental capacities. The term is far from being monosemantic: in some important contexts it is similar to “soul,” more often it is closer to “spirit,”
but at the same time it is closer to “the self” and “the pure subject” which
differs from everything that can be objectified. The name of ātmavāda contrasts this doctrine to those two forms of opposition to mind-body dualism mentioned earlier. In India their equivalents were dehatmāvāda (“the
teaching that Ātman is the body”), that is, materialist physicalism-cumeliminativism, and anātmavāda (“the teaching that Ātman doesn’t exist”),
or the Buddhist substitution of Ātman by fluxes of instant and decentered spots of consciousness-cum-existence (dharmas). The champions of
ātmavāda were more careful in controversy with the Buddhists, their much
more sophisticated and influential opponents, but for investigation of intercultural substance dualism their engagement with the materialists is
of more interest. We will follow now its main landmarks from the beginnings up to the end of the early medieval period.
It was already before the birth of philosophy in India, in the touching
myth of the ancient Chāndogya-Upaniṣad (from the eighth to seventh century B.C.) about the king of gods Indra and demon Virocana, two disciples
of Prajāpati, the father of all living beings, where anxieties of the pious
Brāhmaṇic society about naturalistic moods were first reflected. According to this tale, these two characters, as representatives of their clans and
desirous of the knowledge of Ātman, studied thirty-two years at the feet
of Prajāpati before he decided to examine them. Having commanded them
to array and adorn themselves and look in a pan of water, he declared
their reflections in water to be the Ātman they were searching for. While
Virocana returned to the demons with a tranquil heart, Indra realized that
such an Ātman, which depends on successful and unsuccessful conditions of the body and so perishes immediately after the latter’s destruction, could not satisfy him. He therefore remained with Prajāpati about
seventy more years before the acquisition of full knowledge (VIII.7–12).5
Of more interest is, however, the concise description of those who, like
Virocana, regard the self as the body: they are not givers, have no faith and
do not offer sacrifices (VIII.8.5). So even at the dawn of Indian thought, it
was understood that the teaching of the self as reducible to the body was
incompatible with religious faith and duties.
5
Here and below I refer to the editions of the Pali Text Society; the first number indicates
the corresponding volumes, the second one pages.
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Up to the time of the first philosophers of India (or, what is the same, of
the first attempts at rational critique and systemization of world-outlook),
which coincides with the Ṡramaṇic intellectual revolution of the fifth century B.C., this intuition of the Brāhmaṇists had been fully confirmed. According to the Buddhist Pali Samaññaphalasutta, Ajita Kesakambala, the
leader of the materialists, insisted that inasmuch as a man was a mere
combination of the four natural elements (earth, water, fire, and wind)
and is to be disintegrated after death back into them, cremation should
be the only real offering and only fools talk about the use of generosity
(Dīgha-Nikāya I.55). There are also several other Buddhist and one Jaina
source of good antiquity where such views are reproduced. In addition, in
the Brahmajāla-sutta (Dīgha-Nikāya I.34–36), the views of those who insist
on “the final destruction, decline and nonbeing” of men are referred to,
and this doctrine is designated as ucchedavāda (“the teaching of destruction”), a name later extended to the whole teaching of the materialists.
The same sources also describe the teaching of another famous Ṡramaṇic
philosopher, Pakudha Kaccāyana, who held the opposite viewpoint. According to the afore-mentioned Samaññaphalasutta, he selected the seven
essences (kāya) “by none made, fabricated neither directly, nor indirectly,
barren, stable as the picks of mountains, immutable as pillars” whose
combinations give us what we call living beings (Dīgha-Nikāya I.56). He
included in his list the four natural elements which were accepted by Ajita
and everyone else, but, in addition, the essences of contentment and suffering and the spiritual principle (jīva). Although the ethical conclusions deduced by Pakudha from his scheme did not surpass those inferred by Ajita
from his unsophisticated ontology,6 his philosophical world picture was
beyond comparison much richer. The Jaina version of his list of essences,
from which contentment and suffering were subtracted, space added and
the spiritual principle remained untouched (Sutrakṛtāñga I.1.1.15), also
supports the view that Pakudha was the first consistent substance dualist
in Indian philosophy.
In the opinion of some Indologists, the direct opposition between Ajita and Pakudha is recollected in Pali literature.7 But of more importance
is the fact that the mind-body problem was included in the list of topics
which were discussed by professional Ṡramaṇic philosophers at their sessions. From many Pali texts one can derive technical designations of both
mutually opposed positions (Majjhima-Nikāya I.484, etc.). The materialist
one was designated as taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ (“what is the body, the same is
the soul”) which literally corresponds to the contemporary identity theory
of mind, and the dualist one as aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīraṃ (“the body is
6
According to him, when a man cleaves a head in twain with a sharp sword, he does not
thereby deprive anyone of life because the sword only penetrates between the seven substances, and when someone teaches another one it is, in the final analysis, only an illusion,
for in reality the self is not the doer.
7
See, e.g., B. Barua, A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy (Delhi, etc.: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970 [1st ed. 1921]), p. 294.
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one, the soul is other”). From the same Ṡramaṇic century also dates, most
likely, the ethical counter-argument launched against materialistic mindbody monism by Jina Mahāvīra and his first disciples, i.e., that those who
hold to this view cannot distinguish between good and evil.
The topic of the existence of Ātman as the immaterial essence substantially different from the body and its functional structure remains one of
the most important subjects of controversy in the period of the early philosophical schools as well, i.e., from the fourth century B.C. up to the second
century A.D. At least, some dialogues from the didactic books of the great
Indian epic Mahābhārata give evidence concerning it. For example, in the
Bharadvāja-Bhṛgu dialogue the first character, acting as the champion of
a generalized materialist position, tries to prove that Ātman is in every
respect superfluous. While the functions of wind and fire in the fivefold
body8 are entirely certified, the same cannot be said about those of Ātman,
nor that it could be perceivable during the death of a living being. Furthermore, the functions of the five elements are both necessary and sufficient for the sustenance of the body, while it is difficult to find a place for
Ātman in this respect. Hence all priestly hopes are in vain, for a man sacrificing a cow will perish after it and, “if the root of a cut tree does not put
out shoots, even if its seeds grow further, wherein goes the dead?” Bhṛgu,
a spokesman of ātmavāda, retorts that the soul does not suffer annihilation
after the destruction of the body, in the same way as seemingly extinct fire
is preserved in reality in a subtle condition, and it is incorrect to consider
the five elements sufficient for the functioning of a living organism, while
the appearance of Ātman’s return into them is actually only its separation
from them after temporal interaction (XII.179–180).9
Thus the main materialist argument was, according to this dialogue,
that the soul and its actions are not perceivable and, therefore, nonexistent, whereas the dualist argument was that not everything existent is
necessarily perceivable. The latter statement seems reasonable enough,
though one has an impression that the first side was better prepared for
debate. Still more materialist arguments are collected in another chapter,
where the achievements of the famous thinker of the Sāṃkhya tradition
of philosophy named Pañcaśikha are eulogized. The author, wishing to
present the materialistic position, lists many examples of causal factors
(a seed of a tree, the magnet and iron, the sun stone devouring solar rays,
the soil imbibing water, etc.) to show that all causal processes work only
in the sphere of material things. Other examples developed specially for
these debates (one has to bear in mind that in India examples in general
had the force of demonstration) were also adduced by Indian physicalists, e.g., if eternal things like Ātman exist, then an immortal king on the
earth also ought to exist; but the latter case is an absurdity, so the first
That is, consisting of earth, water, fire, wind, and space.
Here and below I refer to the critical edition of the Ṡāntiparvan book of Mahābhārata
published in 1954 by Shripad Krishna Belvalkar.
8
9
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one should also be as well. They also tried to support their doctrines with
epistemological arguments: to admit ceaseless things one has to refer to
the instruments of knowledge (pramāṇa), but perception, the only one reliable among them, repudiates their existence. But the counter-arguments
of the real dualist Pañcaśikha were also much better prepared than those
of the mythical Bhṛgu. He argued that the fact that the soul separates from
the body after the death of a living being does not mean its own corruption; that successful invocation of incorporeal gods refutes the statement
that all causal links are natural; and that the cessation of a living being’s
actions after its physical death testifies against the capability of the body
to be their origin in this life-time (XII.211).
The Sāṃkhya dualists continued to oppose naturalistic physicalism
during the classical stage of Indian philosophy from about the second to
ninth century A.D., when the most important basic texts, i.e., the sūtras
and kārikās, of the main schools, along with commentaries thereon came
into being. Īśvarakṛṣṇa (from the fourth to fifth century A.D.), the author
of the canonical Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, adduces five reasons for the existence of
puruṣa which is the same as Ātman. They are as follows: (1) all aggregations exist for the sake of something else; (2) there must be something opposite to the three guṇas;10 (3) there must also be some controlling factor
required by nonconscious ones; (4) there must also be a subject of experience different from the latter; (5) there is an inclination in the world to
seek freedom, or isolation from the world (vs.17). The main philosophical
method used here (as elsewhere in the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā) is the deduction
of essences from some objective characteristics which must have ontological foundations.11
But the most detailed commentary on the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, the Yuktidīpikā (circa the sixth–seventh centuries A.D.), opens a further space of
controversy. Though its author pays more attention to the Buddhist
anātmavāda, he does not lose a chance to answer typical materialist objections. So in his comments on the same kārikā 17 the generalized materialist opponent states that no instrument of knowledge confirms the
existence of imperceivable objects, such as puruṣa. Sāṃkhya’s answer is
that the latter’s existence is established by inference based on general correlation, for the body, being composite like a bed or other artifact, is meant
for something other than itself. The materialist offers a seemingly reasonable objection, i.e., that one composite may be meant for some other, as
the bed for the man Devadatta. But it is not too easy to take the author of
the Yukti-dīpikā unawares: the heterogeneous principle under discussion
10
According to the Sāṃkhya philosophy these are the three constituents of the primaeval
matter (Prakṛti), or profoundest dimensions of being, which determine everything with the
exception of puruṣas. They are experienced on a more psychological level as pleasure, pain,
and delusion, and on a more ontological one as intelligibility, activity, and restraint.
11
In a similar way the existence of Prakṛti is deduced from the necessity for finite specific
things to require a cause, to have some common foundation for their inner homogeneity, to
imply the corresponding potentiality, etc. (vss. 15–16).
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cannot be composite just because of its imperceptibility, on which the opponent himself insists.
While the Sāṃkhyas postulated a spiritual principle directly as the necessary condition of the establishment of experience, the Naiyayikas inferred it through the abstract inference “by residue” (śeṣavat), that is, by
excluding all other explanations of experience. That is why, according to
the Nyāya-sūtras (from the third to fourth century A.D.), desire, aversion,
effort, pleasure, pain, and cognition are inferential marks of Ātman (I.1.16).
Both the composer of the sūtras and his famous commentator Vātsyāyana
(from the fourth to fifth centuries A.D.) enter into direct polemics with
Indian naturalistic physicalism. The latter first develops an ethical argument against mind-body monism, namely that even a killer, according to
the teaching of the monists, is not responsible for his crime because material elements are not capable of bearing responsibility (III.1.4). The generalized materialist questions this inference to Ātman by supposing that
desire, aversion, and so on may belong to the earth and other components
of the human body as well, since they are capable of activity and inactivity. The Nayayikas reply that activity and inactivity belong also to an axe
and many other inanimate things, but no one ascribes to them mental capacities. The materialist tries to get out of this difficulty by indicating that
desire, aversion, and so on inhere in the body every time, whereas they do
not in the case of an axe. But Vātsyāyana regards this objection as unconvincing, for it contradicts the major premise of the materialist’s syllogism,
i.e., that everything which is active and inactive is endowed with desire
and the like. Besides, he continues, since the body is composed of many
particles capable, according to the opponent, of mental capacities, the result should be an assumption of many subjects of experience in the same
body, which is a sheer absurdity. In addition, the activity and inactivity of
material things are, in general, due to qualities of quite different entities,
such as effort, which has a common locus with saṃskāra, viz., the balance
of immaterial dharma and adharma (III.2.35–37).
But it was Ṡaṃkara (from the seventh to eighth centuries A.D.), the famous founder of Advaita-Vedānta, who offered the most considered refutation of mind-body monism in Indian philosophy of the classical period.
The following are his main arguments in his commentary on the sūtras of
Vedānta, the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya: (1) in contrast to attributes of the body,
thinking or memory are imperceivable in principle; (2) we are conscious
of the elements of the body, but had consciousness been their quality, this
would have been impossible, as it is impossible for fire to burn itself or for
an actor to ride on his own shoulder;12 (3) in contrast to corporeal components which are subject to everlasting change, the self is invariably identical to itself, and common experience confirms this when one says, e.g.,
“This is I who have seen this or that”; (4) from the fact that consciousness
12
One may mention that these examples were borrowed by the Advaitins (among many
other things) from the Buddhist Madhyamaka system, starting with the texts ascribed to its
founder Nāgārjuna (from the second to third century A.D.).
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occurs where the body is present, it does not follow that it is an attribute
of the latter, just as although visual perception occurs when daylight is
present, it does not follow that perception is an attribute of light itself
(III.3.54). Other of Ṡaṃkara’s arguments may be considered as amplifications of these. For example, in the Praśnopaniṣadbhāṣya, having listed the
main attributes of Ātman as contrary to those of the body, i.e., the properties of consciousness, invariability, purity, and partlessness, he underlines
that objects depend on consciousness for their existence, just as color depends on the capacity of seeing for its manifestation (VI.2).
Ṡaṃkara’s disciple Sureśvara, who composed an enormous commentary on his teacher’s commentary on the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad entitled Bṛ
hadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika, also engaged critically materialist arguments. Here the generalized materialist (dehatmāvādin—see above) announces that the famous slogan of the same Upaniṣad, “Verily Ātman is
Brahman” (IV.4.5), being contrary to perception, is to be interpreted figuratively. Intelligence is born by combination of the four elements, and
the most common self-identification, “I am a man,” shows that everyone
identifies himself as the body. Sureśvara answers that, according to his
opponent’s logic, a dead body must be seen as conscious since it too is
a combination of elements. He also mentions that some yogis remember
their previous lives, which proves that a person is not to be reduced to his
present body, and asks why the body, supposed to be Ātman, is sometimes conscious and sometimes not (III.116–155).
III
Let us now draw some conclusions. Some Indian dualists’ premises correspond to those of Plato, i.e., that the spiritual principle is self-moving in
contrast to material elements, which are inert by nature. Others (which are
more essential) are similar to those of Wolff, Reimarus, Mendelsson, and
other philosophers of the Enlightenment, i.e., that the spiritual principle is
uncomposite in contrast to the elements, which are naturally composite.
Finally another, and perhaps the most important, has not been typical of
classical Western substance dualism at all. I mean here a transcendental
point of departure according to which the subject of experience cannot be
placed on the same level of reality with its objects (including the corporeal
locus of the subject itself), and this ontological gap between them provides
the necessary condition for every experience. Some arguments of the Indian dualists sound naive now, e.g., that a dead body must be seen by their
opponents as conscious inasmuch as a combination of elements is present
there, or the ethical argument of the Naiyayikas that physicalism leads to
immorality (since for consistent materialists ethical considerations should
not be very persuasive). But the arguments from the ontological difference
between composite and uncomposite entities, on the one hand, and pure
subjectivity and objectivity, on the other, adduced in the beginning by
the Sāṃkhyas and later reinforced by Advaitins, have, I think, sufficient
cumulative force that they remain entirely relevant. There is no doubt that
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Ṡaṃkara’s very graphic argument about the inability of fire to burn itself
and for a dancer to ride on his own shoulder belongs to the “gold reserves” of intercultural mind-body dualism. The same is true also of his
argument that from the statement that an essence X with attributes A, B, C
correlates with an essence Y with contrary attributes, it in no way follows
that X is Y, and of his example of visual capacity and daylight.
Returning now to the outset of this paper, it has become evident that
the postmodernist assignment of metaphysics to a purely European heritage proves to be only an illiterate ideological myth, revealing just will to
power—over unqualified minds. Moreover, different versions of Indian
mind-body dualism do correspond to the diversity of metaphysical reflection. The dualism of Pakudha Kaccāyana grows from examination of
the capacity (or lack thereof) of substances to be atomic, i.e., irreducible
to anything more primary, unchangeable and eternal, criteria which are
purely metaphysical in nature. Dualism of the classical Sāṃkhya grows
from the deduction of first principles based, in turn, on a hierarchy of
speculatively possible predicates of things. Dualism of Nyāya grows from
inference of substances based, this time, on the reasonable localization
of their actions and attributes. And one cannot but recognize in all these
kinds of mind-body dualism the general mark of classical metaphysics,
i.e., the investigation of imperceivable entities that lie behind the perceptible empirical world.
Nor do we have reason to agree with the popular view that Indian doctrines (as non-European—see above), including those of the soul, are best
seen as a challenge to Western theism. Certainly there is not a full coincidence, the main and very important difference being that India lacked
the teaching of the creation of the soul, instead regarding the soul as ontologically independent and, correspondingly, beginningless by nature and
coming to be merely through reincarnation.13 But this is only a half of the
truth, for I do not know any serious scholar who has regarded, e.g., Plato’s
psychology, as we know it from the Phaedo or Phaedrus, to be a challenge
to theism, although the soul has there similar characteristics. On the contrary, the similarities with the theistic teaching of the soul are much more
important. Here one may recollect a clear distinction between two kinds
of truths about God made by Thomas Aquinas in Summa contra Gentiles
I.3. Aquinas distinguishes truths that exceed any rational understanding
(such as that God is both threefold and one at the same time) and those accessible to it (such as that God is existent and one), the latter having been
proved by those philosophers who were led by the natural light of reason
(ducti naturalis lumine rationis). In the same manner in our case rational
truths about the soul, e.g., that it is ontologically heterogeneous to the
body, uncomposite, reflective, and so on, might be filled in by the teaching of its creation. At the same time the ancient Indian realization that the
13
Cf. one of Sureśvara’s arguments referred to above. According to the Nyāya philosophers the initial instincts of a new-born child are to be explained by its recollections of its
experiences in former lives.
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soul’s reduction to the body is incompatible with any religion fully coincides with the theistic worldview (see above).
Finally, the resources of Indian mind-body dualism have a legitimate
role to play in theistic apologetics. In addition to those already mentioned,
they cogently demonstrate the philosophical poverty of contemporary
physicalism, which is a real challenge to theism, however doubtful it is
from a rational point of view. Indeed, the interpretation of mind according
to a behaviorist model of a computer system—which is only a variation on
the theme of La Mettrie’s “man a machine” with disregard of an “engineer”
and “programmer”14—cannot withstand the level of reflection of those Indian philosophers who for so many centuries combated reductionism.
Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of the Sciences

14
In the final analysis this level of understanding mental phenomena is similar to explaining a piano concerto by the actions of a keyboard instrument alone with elimination of both
the pianist and producer of the piano.

